Association for Information Systems

AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
ECIS 2002 Proceedings

European Conference on Information Systems
(ECIS)

2002

Safety Critical Wide Area Network Performance
Evaluation
Tuncay Bayrak
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

Martha R. Grabowski
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2002
Recommended Citation
Bayrak, Tuncay and Grabowski, Martha R., "Safety Critical Wide Area Network Performance Evaluation" (2002). ECIS 2002
Proceedings. 138.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2002/138

This material is brought to you by the European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted
for inclusion in ECIS 2002 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.

SAFETY-CRITICAL WIDE AREA NETWORK
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Tuncay Bayrak
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York, USA
Martha R. Grabowski
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York, USA
and
LeMoyne College
Syracuse, New York, USA

ABSTRACT
The growing importance of real-time computing in numerous applications poses problems for network
architectures, especially safety-critical Wide Area Networks (WANs). Assessing network performance
in safety-critical real-time systems is difficult, and suggests the use of both human and technical
performance criteria because of the importance of both dimensions in safety-critical settings. This
research proposes a model that considers both technical and human performance in network
evaluation.

1. INTRODUCTION
Wide Area Networks (WANs) are important components in safety-critical environments where
reliable data acquisition and distribution are essential. In such systems, network equipment and
functions must be closely monitored and controlled to ensure safe operation and prevent costly
consequences. As networks become more complex, the probability of system failure increases,
particularly for real-time WANs which contain hundreds of nodes. Examples of such safety-critical
wide area networks include distributed battle management systems (Mosher, 1997), intelligent
transportation systems (Andrisano et al., 2000), distributed health care networks (Yamamoto et al.,
2000), global oil and gas exploration and research networks (MacIntyre, 1999), and aviation traffic
monitoring systems (National Research Council, 1997; Cheng et al., 2000).
Most large-scale networks depend on hardware, software, human operators and other network
elements to function correctly. Failure of any of the network elements can bring the entire network
down and in safety-critical settings, the consequences can be disastrous. A well-known example of
such failure is the 1990 nationwide AT&T network failure (Kuhn, 1997). This example is not an
isolated one: according to the Federal Communication Commission (FCC), network failures in the
United States with impact on more than 30,000 customers happen on the order of one every two days
and the mean time to repair them is on the order of five to 10 hours (Demeester, et al., 1999).
In safety-critical settings, the human, environmental, and economic consequences of network failures
can be staggering. Network reliability is critical in these settings, as failure of a real-time system could
cause an economic disaster or the loss of human lives (Shin, 1993). Since survivability and reliability
are crucial in safety-critical systems, careful evaluation of these systems is important. However, few
evaluation models of real-time safety-critical wide area networks have been developed, a need that
motivates this research.
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2. THEROTICAL FOUNDATIONS
Over the years, networks have been evaluated by different disciplines from different perspectives.
Mathematical models based on queuing theory, Markov analysis and using well-defined metrics such
as throughput, response time, and utilization have been used in many network performance
evaluations (Haverkort, 1998; Bolch, et al., 1998; Higginbottom, 1998). Other metrics utilized include
network traffic performance (Adie, et al., 1998; Banerjee, et al., 1997), circuit overhead of switches
(Niehaus, et al., 1997; Da Silva, et al., 1997), and equipment used and network conditions (Da Silva,
et al., 1997).
Statisticians frequently use statistical distributions to evaluate communication networks as
distributions allow prediction of system performance measures to a reasonable degree of accuracy
(Akar, et al., 1998). Technical communication models often consider network traffic over switches,
routers, bridges and repeaters (Khalil, et al., 1995). Social and organizational communication models
consider networks of organizations, their patterns of behavior and communication strategies, and
organizational structures (Monge, et al., 1998; Orlikowski, et al., 1995).
Large-scale system models evaluate networks in terms of two important concepts, reliability and
survivability. Survivability is defined as the percentage of total traffic surviving some network failure
in the worst case (Myung, et al., 1999). Reliability is a measure of the system’s ability to provide
deterministic and accurate delivery of information (McCabe, 1998). In other words, reliability is the
likelihood that a system will remain operational (potentially despite failures) for the duration of a
mission (Somani and Nittin, 1997).
Technical metrics used to evaluate wide area networks include system reliability, availability, system
usage, Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) and Mean Time to Repair (MTTR). These measures
have been suggested by mathematical models, large-scale system models, statistical and technical
communication models, and are often interdependent. For example, increased use (e.g., an increased
number of users) of a real-time WAN may result in decreased reliability, decreased network accuracy,
decreased response time, and increased network workload. Similarly, increased use of a network may
cause degradation or wearout in the network components, thus leading to lower reliability, erroneous
data, and perhaps erroneous information. Hence, frequency of network use may not always be a good
success measure; in fact, it may trigger undesired reliability problems such as increased network
workload, and decreased response time, which is critically important for safety-critical applications.
Other important performance measures for networks include message delay, variance of delay,
message loss and overflow (Adie et al., 1998; Bolch, et al., 1998; Higginbottom, 1998). Delay is the
amount of time from the moment a message arrives until its service is complete. Loss ratio is the ratio
between the total number of messages lost and the total number of messages arriving. Overflow
probability is the probability that the number of messages in a network buffer exceeds a certain
threshold. Two other message characteristics--peak and mean traffic--have also been utilized as
metrics. Mean traffic is simply the average number of messages generated in a unit of time. Peak
traffic represents the highest rate of traffic generated. If the service rate is equal to or higher than the
peak rate, no messages will be buffered, and the loss ratio will be equal to zero. If the service rate is
lower than the mean arrival rate, the queue will lead to unacceptable levels of delay, loss ratio, and
overflow probability.
Metrics such as the processing delay at each node, the capacity of each link, and round trip
propagation delay--the time it takes a bit to travel along the media at the speed of light--have also been
used as performance criteria (Bournas, 1995), as have the average queue length of messages awaiting
service, utilization, throughput, node delay, and end-to-end delay metrics (Chirchir and Kamal, 1995).
Finally, redundancy is a metric that is often considered in network evaluations. A network should be
able to accomplish its objectives satisfactorily despite failures of individual network components. For
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real-time networks to survive failures, designers must often incorporate redundancy, which can
involve assigning more hardware and software components (Berman and Kumar, 1999). However,
redundancy may increase network complexity and increase network usage, especially in applications
where network survivability is crucial.
In engineering and business models, WANs have been evaluated from the customer point of view,
using such criteria as cost, connectivity, bandwidth/speed, data integrity, availability, reliability, and
security (Hemrick, 1992). Business models consider network performance as a means of enhancing
the performance of an enterprise (Yang et al., 2001) because network managers are interested in fully
functional, high performance, and secure networks that provide resilient services (Rudd, 2000). Highperformance enterprise networks can help an enterprise operate more efficiently and improve its
competitive capability. Thus, economic aspects are always important (Yang et al., 2001).
From an organization’s point of view, however, networks are seen as an investment. Jurison (1996)
argues that success measures of interest to managers are those that can be measured and expressed
quantitatively, especially in monetary terms, because such measures can be used for justifying
information technology investments. Thus, organizations are usually interested in knowing cost
savings, reliability, accuracy, flexibility, timeliness of data, decision support applications, isolation,
integration, user involvement, security, and back-up requirements (Axelrod, 1982). Finally,
psychological and sociological models of network performance assess optimal communication
structures, improvement of decision making, the impact of communication networks on organizations
and their performance, and distribution of decision making rights over the network using such metrics
as the time taken to correctly solve a problem, the number of messages used for each problem, and the
number of errors (Jehiel, 1999; Mackenzie, 2000).
Thus, network evaluation has been considered in different ways by different disciplines over the past
forty years. Many of these evaluations focus on network technical performance, or an organization’s
performance when using a network, or individual users’ performance when using a network. Few
evaluations, however, consider both social and technical impacts of network performance, both of
which are key in safety-critical large-scale systems. Because humans and technology cooperatively
perform tasks in network-centered safety-critical large-scale systems, the model proposed in the next
section for performance evaluation of safety-critical WANs in real-time settings encompasses both
social and technical dimensions. We now describe the model and its theoretical underpinnings.

3. THEORETICAL MODEL
The different literatures surveyed illustrate that network evaluation has been considered from several
perspectives --technical, social, organizational, psychological and commercial. In safety-critical
settings, where network failures can have catastrophic effects and networks provide an important
social and technical infrastructure, utilizing performance criteria that reflect the differing requirements
that such networks must meet is important [So and Durfee 1996]. For instance, real-time safetycritical WAN’s must meet stringent response, availability, reliability, survivability, accuracy and
redundancy requirements; thus, use of technical performance criteria can provide some measure of the
network’s ability to meet those requirements. Similarly, real-time WAN’s in safety-critical settings
must also meet critical communication, decision-making, problem-solving and organizational
effectiveness requirements; as a result, social, psychological and organizational network performance
criteria can also be used to measure the social and organizational effectiveness of the network
infrastructure. Finally, in many cases, real-time WAN’s in safety-critical settings must also satisfy
demanding commercial and economic requirements, as befitting their industrial hosts. Thus,
commercial and economic performance criteria can provide measures of the network’s ability to
satisfy its economic and resource requirements. These requirements suggest important performance
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criteria for use in evaluating real-time WAN’s in safety-critical settings. In such evaluations,
technical, social, organizational, psychological, commercial and economic evaluation criteria provide
a means of measuring the performance of the network, and of addressing the social, technical and
economic challenges faced by real-time WAN’s.
Social, Psychological and
Organizational Variables
-Communication volume
-Communication type
-Communication frequency
-Type of problem solving
-Problem solving effectiveness
-Accuracy of decisions
-Timeliness of decisions
-Effectiveness of decisions
-System usage

S

I+G
Individual & Group
Variables
SE
System & Environmental
Variables
-Acts of nature
-Hardware failures
-Software failures
-Power failures

T

-# of users
-Operator knowledge & skills
-Vigilance
-Workload
-Stress
-Fatigue
-Satisfaction
-Confidence

P (N)

T
Technical Metrics

Network Performance

-Network reliability
-Survivability
-Availability
-Network accuracy
-Response time
-Redundancy
-Ease of use

-Mathematical Models
-Statistical Models
-Engineering System Models
-Large-Scale Models
-Business Models
-Technical communication
Models

Commercial and
Economic Metrics
-Cost
-Security
-Economic/ resource
allocation effectiveness
-Resource availability
-Resource reliability

HP (N)

Human Performance with
Network
-Psychological & Sociological
Models
-Organizational Models
-Communication Models
-Human factors Models

System & Organizational
Performance
Interactions
-Visual and physical
interfaces with system
-Execution environment
P (S)

E

I

-Large scale system models
-Safety-critical system models
-Disaster response models
-Socio-technical system models
-Organizational structure
-Organizational behavior
-Communication structure
-Organizational culture
-Organizational commitment
-Organizational policies

Figure 1. Proposed Model

Figure 1 illustrates the proposed evaluation approach. Three types of performance are of interest in
evaluating WANs in real-time safety-critical settings: the performance of the network P (N); the
human performance of those using the network --both operator and user-- HP (N); and the
performance of the system and organization P (S), as seen in Figure (1). Real-time networks interact
with humans, the environment, and other technologies, and interactions between these different
elements may contribute to network failures. Hence, in addition to traditional technical performance
considerations, the Figure 1 WAN evaluation model considers human factors and environmental
considerations. This is because human error and acts of nature are among the major sources of failures
in networks (Kuhn, 1997).
As discussed earlier, technical variables (T), such as network reliability, accuracy, response time and
utilization, certainly impact network performance P (N), as do social, psychological and
organizational variables (S), commercial and economic variables (E), human performance with the
network HP (N), or system and environmental variables (SE) such as hardware failures, software
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failures and acts of nature, and interactions (I) between the network and its working environment
(Figure 1). Network performance, therefore, is a function of technical variables such as reliability,
accuracy, response time and utilization; social, psychological and organizational variables such as
communication type, frequency, and timeliness of decisions; commercial and economic variables such
as cost and security; human performance with the network; as well as a function of system and
environmental variables, such as acts of nature or power failures; and interactions between the
network and its physical and execution environment. Network performance can be assessed using a
variety of mathematical, statistical, engineering system, large-scale system, and business models, as
explained in Section 2, and the relationships between the network performance factors can be
expressed in the following way:
P (N) = f (T +S+E+SE +I + HP (N))
where P(N) = performance of the network,
T= technical network variables,
S= social, psychological and organizational variables,
E= commercial and economic variables,
SE = system and environmental variables,
I = interactions between the network and its working environment, and
HP (N)= human performance with a network.
Note that in Figure 1, technical variables (T) also influence commercial and economic variables such
as cost and social, psychological and organizational variables (S), such as accuracy, communication
and system usage. These are indirect effects on network performance P(N), and the impact vectors in
Figure 1 for these variables are shown as dotted lines.
In turn, network performance P (N) influences human performance with the network HP (N) as well
as the performance of the system that the network serves P (S). Individual (I) and group (G) variables
such as user knowledge and skills, vigilance and workload, also influence human performance with
the network HP (N), as seen in Figure.
Human performance with a network is thus influenced by the network’s performance as well as by
individual and group variables such as individual or group’s knowledge or skills, workload, stress,
experience with networking, and /or fatigue. Human performance with a network also influences the
network’s performance, and can be assessed using a variety of psychological, sociological,
organizational, human factors, and communication models. These relationships can be expressed as:
HP (N) = f (P (N) + I +G)
where HP (N) = human performance with a network,
P (N) = performance of the network,
I = individual performance variables, and
G = group performance variables.
Similarly, in Figure 1, social, psychological and organizational variables (S) influence individual (I)
and group (G) variables such as workload, stress, and fatigue.
Finally, overall system performance for the systems that host real-time WANs is influenced by the
performance of a network P(N) as well as by human performance with the network HP(N), as in P (S)
= P(N) + HP (N),
where P (S)= performance of the system,
P (N)= performance of the network, and
HP (N)= human performance with a network.
1232
ECIS 2002 • June 6–8, Gdańsk, Poland

— First — Previous — Next — Last — Contents —

Safety-Critical Wide Area Network Performance Evaluation

System performance can be assessed using large-scale, socio-technical and safety-critical system
models,
as well as by examining the system and organizational structures, policies, performance,
behavior and culture.
It is obvious that systems success is both a social and technical accomplishment, but success/failure is
far more complex than totaling up a number of factors. Differences in the various elements of the
proposed model in order to evaluate the system as a success or failure will be accommodated in
forthcoming research.
In the following section, we describe use of the Figure 1 model in evaluating an operational real-time
WAN.

4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
4.1 Research Vehicle
There are two sets of subjects for this research: an operational wide area network (WAN) for the
network performance evaluation, the operators who utilize the network for the human performance
evaluation.
The vehicle for this study is an operational WAN known as the Continuous Operational Real-Time
Monitoring System (CORMS). CORMS was designed and built by the U.S. National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and was implemented in April 1998. CORMS’s purpose is to
provide a 24 hour/day monitoring and quality control of water level and meteorological data from
around the US to ensure the availability and accuracy of tide and water current observations that are
used for navigation and safety of life and property decisions. To do this, CORMS takes input from
two NOAA systems, the Physical Oceanographic Real Time System (PORTS) and the National Water
Level Observation Network (NWLON). PORTS collects meteorological (wind, weather, tide current,
etc.,) and environmental data from San Francisco, New York, Tampa Bay, Houston/Galveston,
Chesapeake Bay, and Narragansett Bay in the United States. NWLON, which collects water-level
data, is comprised of 189 water level gauges located around the coastal United States, including
Alaska, Hawaii, and U.S. territories in the Pacific, and Great Lakes.
The PORTS meteorological data and the NWLON water level data is gathered continuously via the
CORMS network and transferred in real-time to the CORMS server at NOAA headquarters in Silver
Spring, Maryland. 6 minute sample data from the real-time NWLON and PORTS data is monitored
continuously in 24/7 mode by 6 watchstanding operators who monitor the CORMS data and displays
and determine what actions are necessary if the accuracy of any of the measured parameters is deemed
to be questionable (NOAA, 1999).
Since this paper focuses on establishing a technical baseline only, the human factors are not elaborated
in the theoretical background. However, in forthcoming evaluation, the focus will be placed on the
human factors. Thus, the forthcoming evaluation will focus on network monitoring watchstanders
monitoring a Visual Display Terminal and responding based on the information displayed and
behavioral patterns of 24x7 watchstanders. The purpose of the operator performance evaluation was to
determine how technical variables such as network reliability and response time and individual and
group variables such as workload and vigilance level influence operators’ performance with the
network under study.
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4.2 Procedure
Hypotheses, variables, their operationalizations and measurements for evaluating a safety-critical realtime WAN were developed following the model in Figure 1, as seen in Table 1. Network performance
was to be evaluated by utilizing well-defined and well-known network performance metrics such as
reliability, availability, and response time. The appropriate statistical tests and mathematical analyses
were run on collected data, and the results of the mathematical analyses and statistical tests were used
to evaluate the hypotheses.
Table 1. Hypotheses, Dependent Variables, and Metrics
#

Hypotheses

Dependent Variable

Variable Operationalization

Measurement

1

1a:Increased use (# of users) of
real-time WAN will result in
decreased network reliability.

Network reliability

1)

Type, and time of
breakdowns.

1)

MTBF, MTTR,
Availability (%).

1b:Increased use (# of users) of
real-time WAN will result in
decreased network accuracy.

Network accuracy

2)

Correctness of data.

2)

Probability of
detecting error.

1c:Increased use (# of users) of
real-time WAN will result in
decreased network response
time.

Network response time

3)

Time taken to obtain
response.

3)

Mean response
time.

Network workload

4)

How much traffic is
flowing from a given
source to a given
destination network.

4)

Flow volume in
bytes.

1d:Increased use (# of users) of
real-time WAN will result in
increased network workload.
2

2a:In safety-critical and realtime settings, increased
network redundancy will result
in increased network workload

Network workload

1)

How much traffic is
flowing from a given
source to a given
destination network.

1)

Flow volume in
bytes.

2b:In safety-critical and realtime settings, increased
network redundancy will result
in increased cost,

Network cost of spare
resources

2)

Spare resource units
utilized.

2)

Capital
expenditure.

2c:In safety-critical and realtime settings, increased
network redundancy will result
in increased usage,

Network usage

3)

Level of system use.
3)

Frequency of
network use by an
operator.

2d:In safety-critical and realtime settings, increased
network redundancy will result
in increased network reliability.

Network reliability

4)

MTBF, MTTR,
Availability (%)

4)

Type, and time of
breakdowns.

Hypothesis 1: Increased use of a real-time WAN will negatively impact on WAN performance.
Large-scale network performance usually deteriorates as the number of users and operators who
utilize the network increase. For instance, network response time slows when an increased numbers of
users want to get response from the system simultaneously. WAN usage was measured in this research
by the number of users and operators who utilize the network.
In this study, WAN performance was measured using reliability, accuracy, response time, and
network workload metrics. For the CORMS system, reliability was measured by type and time of
communication breakdowns, using Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF), Mean Time To Repair
(MTTR), and availability as the three main metrics. Correctness of network data is especially
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important for safety-critical networks. Network accuracy was measured by correctness of data using
the probability of detecting inaccurate data by the network. Network response time, crucial in safetycritical applications, was measured by collecting mean response time data. Finally, network workload
was measured by assessing how much data traffic was flowing from a data source to a destination
using data registered every six minutes by the equipment in each station. Thus, these hypotheses
assess the impact of network usage on network performance.
Hypothesis 2: In safety-critical and real-time settings, increased network redundancy will result
in decreased network performance, and increased cost.
In safety-critical settings, redundancy may be employed to decrease mean time to repair, to ensure
continuous flow of data, and to increase availability percentage; however, it may have some
drawbacks such as increased equipment cost. Redundancy in this study was measured by the amount
of monetary resources allocated and utilized for the redundant equipment (etc., hardware, software).
In this study, network performance was measured using network workload, cost, usage, and reliability.
For the CORMS systems, network workload was operationalized by calculating the amount of data
traffic in bytes flowing from each station to the CORMS system. Network cost was measured by the
capital expenditure spent for redundant resource units. Similarly, network usage was measured by
assessing how often the network was used by operators and users. Finally, network reliability was
measured using MTBF, MTTR, and availability, as in hypothesis 1.
4.3 Current status
The literature review is concluded, and the proposed model, hypotheses, dependent variables, and
their operationalizations to evaluate subjects have been defined. Currently, data collection and survey
administration are in progress, as is analysis of the collected data. Results will be available for
conference presentation.
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